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We consider how audit quality impacts sell-side analysts’ information environment. 
Using the method outlined by Barron et al. (1998), we examine whether higher audit 
quality is associated with differences in the weight analysts place on common 
information relative to private information, as well as the extent to which audit quality 
separately impacts the precision of analysts’ private and common information. Our 
results show that, in instances where analysts revise their earnings forecasts for year 
t+1 shortly after the release of year t earnings, higher audit quality results in analysts 
placing more weight on public information. The precision of private (as well as 
public) information is improved. These results extend our understanding of how audit 
quality impacts on attributes of analysts’ forecasts and provides support for the 
argument that audit quality has important capital market implications.  
 






The aim of this paper is to extend our understanding of how audit quality impacts 
capital market participants, specifically sell-side analysts. Prior research generally 
finds that high-quality auditors are associated with improved quality and reliability of 
accounting information (Dechow et al. 2010; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Francis 2011). 
There is also extensive evidence that capital market participants seem to differentiate 
and value audit quality.1 One stream of research focuses on financial analysts (e.g., 
Abernathy et al. 2016, Behn et al. 2008, Wu and Wilson 2016). Examination of how 
audit quality impacts on sell-side analysts is appealing, because as Bradshaw (2009) 
notes, analysts are typically assumed to be an important group of relatively informed 
financial statement users. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that audited financial 
statements are a key input into analysts’ forecasting process, especially in the setting 
we examine, namely analysts’ forecast revisions immediately following firms’ annual 
earnings announcements.2  
 
Behn et al. (2008) show that higher audit quality (measured by Big N audit firms) is 
associated with increased accuracy and reduced dispersion in earnings forecasts 
issued by sell-side analysts. However, some studies explicitly question whether 
financial analysts actually pay attention to audit quality. For example, Donovan et al. 
(2014) examine the transcripts of conference calls and find that analysts rarely 
mention and question the audit or auditors. Further, a recent survey of sell-side 
analysts (Brown et al. 2015) suggests that analysts rate an audit by a Big 4 auditor as 
a relatively less important signal of earnings quality.3 Additional concerns also arise 
from the sensitivity of Behn et al.’s results to the way in which auditor quality is 
captured. In contrast to their results using a simple Big N distinction, they are unable 
to identify within the Big N sample any association between properties of analysts’ 
forecasts and measures of industry specialization, which are commonly accepted as 
an indicator of audit quality (DeFond and Zhang 2014).  
                                                 
1 Examples include initial public offering valuation (IPOs) (Feltham et al. 1991; Weber and Willenborg 
2003), the cost of debt (Pittman and Fortin 2004; Mansi et al. 2004), earnings response coefficients 
(Teoh and Wong 1993; and earnings (i.e., accrual) valuation (Krishnan 2003). Aobdia et al. (2015) 
discuss and use several of these measures. 
2 In a similar manner, Bradshaw et al. (2001, p. 46) characterize sell-side analysts as “professional 
investment intermediaries who specialize in interpreting accounting information”. 
3 An important caveat is that Brown et al. (2015) survey analysts who typically follow larger 





Our research extends prior evidence of an association between audit quality indicators 
and the actions of sell-side analysts. In contrast to earlier studies that examine the 
association between indicators of audit quality and properties of analysts’ forecasts 
such as accuracy and dispersion (Behn et al. 2008; Payne 2008; Wu and Wilson 2016), 
we investigate the extent to which indicators of audit quality are associated with 
properties of analysts’ information environment. Specifically, we investigate whether 
widely used indicators of audit quality (i.e., Big N auditor status and auditor client-
industry specialization) are associated with more precise common and/or private 
information being reflected in revisions of analysts’ forecasts for year t+1 
immediately following the release of earnings for year t. Our evidence therefore 
speaks to the question of whether analysts place more weight on audited financial 
statement information when audit quality is expected to be higher.  
 
It is generally believed that analysts’ information set contains both public (i.e., 
common) and idiosyncratic (i.e., private) components (Chen and Jiang 2006). The 
common information set available to all analysts includes the contents of audited 
financial statements, and it is well documented that analysts use financial statement 
information to formulate and revise earnings forecasts (e.g., Abarbanell and Bushee 
1997; Schipper 1991; Zhang 2008; Barron et al. 2017, Bradshaw et al. 2018).  There 
is extensive evidence that commonly used proxies for audit quality such as audit firm 
size and client industry specialization are associated with higher quality financial 
reports (Reichelt and Wang 2010; Dechow et al. 2010; Kanagaretnam et al. 2010; Jin 
et al. 2011; DeBoskey and Jiang 2012). Provided these attributes impact actual inputs 
to analysts’ decision processes, we expect they will assign more weight to the 
financial statements audited by a high-quality auditor. Therefore, we expect a positive 
association between audit quality and the weight on common information reflected in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
 
Furthermore, if high quality audits help to improve the quality of financial statements 
and make publicly available accounting information more informative of future 
earnings, then we expect a positive association between audit quality and the 
precision of analysts’ common information. As we have already noted, audit quality is 
associated with several attributes of financial reporting that are likely to result in less 
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manipulated financial statements. For example, higher audit quality has been shown to 
be associated with lower absolute unexpected accruals (Becker et al. 1998). 
Unexpected accruals are also far less predictive of future earnings than either the cash 
or expected accrual components (Xie 2001). As audited financial statements are 
generally available to all analysts, then to the extent analysts rely on common 
information they should all benefit from higher audit quality.  
 
Finally, audit quality could also affect the precision of analysts’ private information, 
although the direction of any predicted effect is unclear. On the one hand, public and 
private information may be substitutes (Verrecchia 1982; Kim and Verrecchia 1991). 
In this case, improved quality of public information resulting from higher audit 
quality may reduce analysts’ incentive to acquire private information. On the other 
hand, if a subset of analysts has superior information processing skills, then higher 
quality common information may allow certain analysts to develop idiosyncratic 
insights that are not commonly shared (Kim and Verrecchia 1994, 1997), resulting in 
an improvement in the precision of analysts’ private information. Although Byard and 
Shaw (2003) find that higher corporate disclosure quality is associated with increased 
precision in both the common and private information of analysts, the expected effect 
for audit quality is ultimately dependent on the means by which audit quality and 
private signals interact. While this is ultimately an empirical question, we expect that 
any change in the precision of analysts’ private information will be less than the 
increase in the precision of common information, thereby resulting in an overall 
increase in the weight on common information.  
 
Our empirical measures of the relative weights analysts place on common and private 
information, as well as their respective precisions, are taken from Barron et al. (1998, 
hereafter BKLS). While these measures have been used to examine analysts’ 
information environment in a number of settings (Barron et al. 1998, 2002, 2005, 
2008; Byard and Shaw 2003; Botosan and Plumlee 2004; Mohanram and Sunder 2006; 
Byard et al. 2011; Han et al. 2013; Altschuler et al. 2015; Barron et al. 2017; 
Bradshaw et al. 2018; Keshk and Wang 2018), we are unaware of any examples 
where their association with commonly used indicators of audit quality has been 
considered. Consistent with the approach suggested in Barron et al. (2017) and 
Bradshaw et al (2018), we use analysts’ earnings forecast revisions following the 
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release of annual earnings results to derive measures of the change in consensus (i.e., 
the change in the proportion of total information represented by common information), 
and changes in the precision of analysts’ common and private information. Applying 
this approach enables us to show how audit quality impacts on underlying 
characteristics of analysts’ information set via reactions to the release of audited 
earnings (in this case, consensus and precision) rather than just examining the 
correlation with forecast attributes such as accuracy and dispersion. 
 
Using a Big N indicator and multiple measures of auditor industry specialization as a 
proxy for higher audit quality, the results consistently show that higher quality audits 
are associated with a larger increase in analysts’ consensus, supporting our prediction 
that analysts incorporate more common information into their forecasts for firms using 
higher quality auditors. Further, we find that the precision of both analysts’ common 
and private information tends to increase more when a firm’s financial statements are 
audited by a high quality auditor. The results are also robust to several forms of 
sensitivity analysis, including attempts to control for endogenous auditor choice as 
well as an alternative method for estimating the precision of analysts’ private and 
public information. 
 
Our study makes two important contributions. First, we add to the literature that 
examines how audit quality affects decision making by users of financial statements 
and, by implication, the role of audit quality in capital markets. Other than 
documenting an association between audit quality indicators and forecast attributes 
such as accuracy and dispersion (Behn et al. 2008), there is relatively little evidence 
explicitly linking audit quality to attributes of information underlying sell-side 
analysts’ forecasts. An exception is Cahan et al. (2013) who provide evidence that 
analysts’ forecasts are influenced by their perceptions of audit quality. However, their 
focus is specifically on the collapse of Arthur Andersen and its effect on forecasted 
earnings of their clients.4,5 Our results utilize quite different dependent variables from 
prior research, showing that audit quality has a significant impact on the information 
                                                 
4 Another example is Abernethy et al. (2016), who examine the relation between unexpected audit fees 
and analysts’ forecasts. However, the manner in which unexpected audit fees reflects high versus low 
audit quality is unclear (DeFond and Zhang 2014).  
5 In a similar manner to Cahan et al. (2013), Autore et al. (2009) examine capital market effects of the 
announcement by Arthur Andersen of document shredding. However, they focus on stock price 
reactions, rather than direct effects on sell-side analysts’ output. 
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environment of financial analysts, namely the relative weights analysts place on 
private versus common information. We therefore provide a richer picture of how 
audit quality impacts sell-side analysts, who are widely recognized as relatively 
sophisticated users of audited financial statements. In doing so, we also contribute to 
research on analysts’ information processing by showing that analysts rationally use 
more common information and develop more precise private information when audit 
quality is higher. Our results also support the argument of DeFond and Zhang (2014), 
who argue that analysts are likely to have an interest in audit quality variation. 
 
Second, we utilize a different experimental design than prior studies to show that 
higher quality audits (as captured by client-firm industry specialization) are positively 
associated with the precision of analysts’ common and private information. Studies 
which focus solely on attributes of analysts’ short term earnings forecasts such as 
accuracy or dispersion (Behn et al. 2008; Payne 2008) may potentially confuse the 
role of accounting information (and by implication, audit quality) with numerous 
other information sources such as management earnings forecasts and the myriad 
other data sources observed by analysts over the financial year that are correlated with 
future earnings outcomes (Wu and Wilson 2016). 6  However, simply substituting 
longer range forecasts is unlikely to provide a solution, as these forecasts are still not 
explicitly linked to information events where the quality of accounting information is 
likely to be a focus. In contrast, our method explicitly focuses on measures that reflect 
analysts’ reaction to the release of audited financial results. It is well known that 
analysts frequently revise their recommendations shortly after an earnings release 
(Yezegel 2015), consistent with the effect of accounting (and audit) quality being 
most relevant at the time point when analysts likely place most weight on accounting 
information. Our use of changes in the BKLS measures associated with analysts’ 
forecast revisions surrounding the release of audited annual earnings figures is more 
likely to explicitly reflect the information effect of audit quality on sell-side analysts 
than prior research (Bradshaw et al. 2018). It also has the advantage of reducing 
endogeneity concerns in interpreting the results. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the method 
                                                 
6 In addition, Lawrence et al. (2011) argue that the results reported by Behn et al. (2008) linking Big N 
auditors with increased forecast accuracy are largely a result of the failure to adequately control for 
client-firm differences between Big N and non-Big N clients. 
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suggested by BKLS for measuring the quality of common and idiosyncratic 
information available to analysts, as well as our hypotheses. In section 3 we describe 
our measures of audit quality, the sample selection and the method used to empirically 
estimate the measures suggested by BKLS (i.e., forecast revisions immediately after 
earnings releases). Section 4 reports our results, as well as several sensitivity tests and 
robustness analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background and hypotheses 
2.1 Measuring analysts’ information environment 
BKLS develop a model of analysts’ forecasting process in which N analysts following 
a firm possess two signals about future earnings. One signal is public (i.e., it is 
common across all analysts) and the other is private (i.e., it is idiosyncratic). The 
common information is identical across all the analysts, while the private information 
is unique and is independently normally distributed with mean zero. Common 
information has precision h and private information has precision s. When 
formulating forecasts, analysts weight their common and private information by their 
respective precision (h or s).  
 
BKLS define consensus (ρ) as the degree to which individual analysts’ forecasts 
contain the same information. In other words, consensus is the ratio of common to 
total information in an analyst’s forecast. This is also consistent with the consensus 
concept outlined by Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990). The BKLS consensus 
measure enables inferences to be drawn about the extent to which analysts base their 
forecasts on public information relative to private information. Intuitively, the 
approach suggested by BKLS reflects the assumption that the dispersion of earnings 
forecasts among analysts reflects the extent to which there is idiosyncratic information 
among analysts, and the information which is common among all analysts is measured 
by the squared error of the mean analysts’ forecast.  
 
Most importantly, BKLS show that their consensus measure can be directly inferred 
from the observable forecast dispersion, error in the mean forecast, and the number of 
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where SE is the expected squared error in the mean forecast, D is the expected 
forecast dispersion, and N is the number of analysts.7  
 
Under certain assumptions, BKLS also show that ρ can be interpreted as the average 
proportion of total information represented by common information in all analysts’ 
forecasts (i.e., the degree of commonality in the average forecast). First, analysts’ 
forecasts must be unbiased, on average. Biased forecasts would inflate the common 
error, resulting in an overstatement of the extent to which forecasts reflect common, 
as distinct from private information. However, our sample selection process (outlined 
below) addresses this issue to some extent by focusing exclusively on forecast 
revisions immediately after earnings releases.  
 
The second important assumption made by BKLS is that actual earnings results do not 
reflect systematic earnings management aimed at meeting or beating the forecast (i.e., 
“benchmark beating”). We think this is a reasonable assumption for two reasons. First, 
prior evidence has failed to establish a link between apparent evidence of benchmark 
beating and firm-specific measures of earnings management such as unexpected 
accruals (Dechow et al. 2003). Second, there are serious doubts about whether 
apparent discontinuities around benchmarks such as analyst’ forecasts can even be 
interpreted as evidence of benchmark beating via earnings management (Durtschi and 
Easton 2005, 2009). 
 
BKLS further extend their analysis by invoking an assumption that analysts’ 
idiosyncratic information is equally precise. 8  Under the assumption of such 
homogenous precision, BKLS show that the precision of common information (h) and 
private information (s) can also be expressed directly in term of SE, D and N, in the 
                                                 
7 The obvious inference is that as the number of analysts following a firm, N, becomes large, 
idiosyncratic errors in the mean forecast tend to cancel out. 
8 The assumption that analysts have equally precise private information is appropriate if analysts are all 
relatively well informed, with little difference in the quality of information available to them. Extant 
research generally fails to find consistent differences in forecast error magnitude across analysts, which 
supports this assumption (Beyer et al. 2010). We also consider an alternative estimation method which 
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As BKLS note, their measures reflect unconditional expectations of forecast 
dispersion and error in the mean forecast (D and SE). Empirical implementation of 
this approach requires pooling of observations to measure dispersion and error in the 
mean forecast. However, averaging of multiple observations has the advantage of 
reducing measurement error and therefore enhanced construct validity. Following 
prior studies (Barron et al. 2002; Byard and Shaw 2003; Bradshaw et al. 2016; Barron 
et al. 2017), we focus on analysts forecast revisions following earnings releases as our 
source of data for these variables.  
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
As we have noted, Behn et al. (2008) demonstrate that higher audit quality is 
associated with less dispersed and more accurate forecasts of earnings by sell-side 
analysts. If audit quality influences analysts’ reliance on audited financial data, then 
we would expect to see a higher proportion of common information reflected in the 
mean forecast, as audited financial statements are public information readily available 
to all analysts. This would result in increased consensus as defined by BKLS (i.e., 
greater relative weight on common information). In the context of audit quality, we 
expect that financial statement data used as inputs to earnings forecasts will be more 
precise when it is audited by a high quality auditor. Hence, our first two hypotheses 
can be stated in alternative form as: 
 
H1: Higher audit quality is associated with increased consensus in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts 
 
H2: Higher audit quality is associated with increased precision of the common 




We acknowledge that the impact of higher audit quality on the private component of 
analysts’ information is dependent, at least in part, on the extent to which private and 
common information act as substitutes or complements. While theoretical arguments 
can be advanced to support either scenario, prior evidence that disclosure quality is 
related to the precision of analysts’ private information (Byard and Shaw 2003) leads 
us to expect that audit quality may also be associated with an improvement in the 
precision of analysts’ private information, but not to the same extent as occurs with 
common information. In other words, intuitively we expect the incremental impact of 
publicly observable audit quality on private information precision is less than the 
effect on public information precision, thereby resulting in an increase in consensus. 
Our third hypothesis can be stated in alternative form as: 
 
H3: Higher audit quality is associated with increased precision in the private 
information component in analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
 
3. Research method and sample selection 
3.1 Measuring audit quality 
Following prior studies, we identify instances of higher audit quality based on 
measures of BigN auditor status and auditor client-industry specialization. Big N 
auditors have been shown to be related to higher audit quality due to their incentives 
and competence (Watts and Zimmerman, 1981; DeFond et al., 2017). Industry 
specialist auditors are more likely to provide higher quality audits, since they are 
better able to detect errors within their industry specialization than other accounting 
firms (Craswell et al. 1995) As with auditor size, there is considerable evidence of 
industry specialist auditors receiving economically significant fee premiums (Francis 
et al. 2005), as well as being associated with higher quality financial reporting 
(Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnan 2003; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Kanagaretnam et al. 
2010; Jin et al. 2011; DeBoskey and Jiang 2012). 
 
Following Balsam et al. (2003) we use four proxies for auditor industry specialization. 
The first two proxies are measures of the auditor’s market share in an industry 
defined by two-digit SIC code, where market shares are computed based on client 
sales and the number of clients respectively. The next two proxies are dummy 
variables indicating the auditor with the largest market share in each two-digit SIC 
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code industry (i.e., “market leader”), and again market shares are calculated in terms 
of client sales and the number of clients respectively. All of our tests rely on audit 
markets at the national level and reflect client–based measures of industry 
specialization and leadership, rather than being restricted to the audit firm client 
portfolio (i.e., a specialist (or leader) is based on the relevant client-firm industry, and 
not restricted to how a given audit firm’s portfolio of clients is comprised). This 
approach is consistent with the evidence provided by Audousset-Coulier et al. (2016), 
who provide an extensive set of validation tests for a wide variety of measures used to 
capture audit firm specialization. They conclude (pg. 153) that measures based on 
large market shares at the client-industry level are “the most consistent and valid ones 
for measuring audit quality”.9 
 
3.2 Sample selection 
Our main analyses are based on a sample of U.S firms. We rely on the IBES 
unadjusted detail database to obtain individual analysts’ forecasts of annual earnings 
for year t+1 from 1985 to 2015 (Payne and Thomas 2003). Our sample selection 
procedure closely follows Byard and Shaw (2003). Specifically, we select forecasts 
issued during the 30-day period immediately after the announcement of earnings of 
year t. We further require that these forecasts are the updates of previous forecasts 
made during the 60-day window immediately before the earnings announcement.   
Barron et al. (2002) identify several reasons for using this approach. First, analysts 
who update their forecasts immediately after the earnings announcement are more 
likely to use their own information and less likely to “herd”. Herding among analysts 
may cause under-estimation of forecast dispersion and introduce measurement error. 
Second, these forecast revisions are conditioned on the same set of information, 
namely annual earnings announcements. This is particularly relevant to our study 
since we are interested in how audit quality, through annual financial statements, 
affects analysts’ information environment. Third, this selection procedure controls for 
forecast recency and excludes stale forecasts that would likely inflate forecast 
dispersion. Once Compustat data requirements are met, we have a sample of 25,111 
firm-years (5,353 unique firms). Table 1 summarizes our step-by-step sample 
selection process. 
 
                                                 
9 We briefly consider possible alternative indicators of audit quality in our sensitivity analysis. 
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Insert Table 1 here 
 
3.3 Research method 
We use analysts’ forecasts issued immediately after the annual earnings 
announcement to calculate realized forecast dispersion ( D̂ ) and squared error in the 
mean forecast ( ES ˆ ) as follows: 
 













1ˆ                                           (4) 
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where Fi is forecast issued by an individual analyst i, F  is the mean analyst forecast, 
A is the actual annual earnings (as stated by IBES), and N is the number of analysts.  
 
We scale both realized dispersion ( D̂ ) and squared error in the mean forecast ( ES ˆ ) by 
the absolute value of actual annual earnings. To eliminate extreme values caused by 
the scaling variable, we delete observations with an absolute value of actual earnings 
of less than 10 cents per share. We then substitute D̂ , ES ˆ and N into equations 1, 2 
and 3 to obtain the estimated analyst consensus, as well as the precision of analysts’ 
common and private information.  
 
To calculate meaningful forecast dispersions, we require that at least two analysts 
update their annual earnings forecasts for year t+1 within the 30-day period following 
the announcement of earnings of year t. Given that the BKLS model requires the 
precision of information (h and s) to be non-negative, we exclude estimates where h is 
negative (by definition, s cannot be negative). To test our hypotheses, we estimate the 
following ordinary least square regressions, using changes in ρ, h and s as the 
dependent variable (DV): 
 
DV = α + β1Audit + β2Surp + β3Size + β4MB + β5Analysts + ε          (6) 
 
Following Bradshaw et al. (2018) and Barron et al. (2017), we use changes in the 
BKLS measures as the dependent variables. Using changes of the measures also helps 
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address endogeneity concerns. Unlike the levels of these measures that are likely to be 
correlated with audit quality due to firms’ financial reporting choices,10 changes in 
BKLS measures more likely reflect changes in analysts’ information environment 
surrounding the annual earnings announcements. 
 
Audit is our measure of audit quality at the end of year t. The hypothesis that higher 
audit quality results in larger improvements to analysts’ information environment 
predicts β1 > 0, namely increased consensus and greater precision of public (and 
possibly) private information for clients of high quality auditors.  
 
We include controls for previously identified determinants of the properties of 
analysts’ information environment (Barron et al. 2008; Barron et al. 2017). Barron et 
al. (2008) find that large earnings surprises are followed by a decrease in analyst 
consensus but an increase in the precision of analysts’ private information.  This 
suggests that large earnings surprises motivate analysts to increase their private 
information search efforts, which in turn lead to their earnings forecasts reflecting a 
higher precision of private information. We measure earnings surprises by Surp, 
computed as the absolute value of the difference between the actual and mean 
forecasted earnings per share for year t, deflated by the absolute value of actual 
earnings per share of year t. Size is a common proxy for the level of a firm’s 
information available to investors. Lys and Soo (1995) show that firm size is 
positively related to analysts’ information precision. We measure firm size as market 
capitalization (in millions of dollars) at the end of year t. We also include the market-
to-book ratio (MB) at the end of year t, to control for firm characteristics related to 
growth opportunities. Finally, we include the number of analysts (Analysts) at the end 
of year t, since Barron et al. (2008) show that more analysts updating their forecasts 
will incorporate more private information into the forecasts and thus reduce the 
consensus.  
 
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel consisting of repeated observations from the same 
set of firms over time. One issue with panel data is that variables often demonstrate 
both cross-sectional and serial correlation, which could result in mis-specified test 
                                                 
10 In unreported results, we find that the levels of BKLS measures are all positively related to the 
measures of audit quality.  
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statistics. To avoid this problem, we adjust standard errors for clustering effects at 
both firm and year level (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010).  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Our final sample consists of 25,111 firm-year observations with non-missing values 
for calculating our measures of the properties of analysts’ information environment, 
and for all of our explanatory variables. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the 
sample. On average, 94.3% of sample firms are audited by a BigN auditor, and about 
a quarter of sample firms are audited by an industry specialist auditor that has the 
largest market share in the relevant industry. 11  The sample firms tend to have 
relatively large market capitalizations.  This is not surprising given we require sample 
firms to be followed by at least two financial analysts and this is more likely to 
capture large firms. The mean value for the change in consensus, Δρ, is positive, as is 
the change in precision of both analysts’ common information, Δh, and private 
information, Δs.12 
 
Our estimates of the change in analysts’ information precision are highly skewed, as 
are some of the explanatory variables. It is also possible that there is a non-linear 
relation between our measures of changes in the properties of analysts’ information 
and the explanatory variables. Thus, following prior research (Barron et al. 2002, 
Byard and Shaw 2003), we use rank regressions to perform multivariate analysis.13 
Finally, since we define auditor industry specialization based on auditors’ industry 
market share in a year, we rank all of our variables within each industry in the year, 
where an industry is defined by its two-digit SIC code.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
                                                 
11 Given that analysts tend to cover larger firms, the high rate of Big N usage is not surprising.  
12 Some prior studies examining the change in consensus around earnings releases report that the 
average change is negative (Barron et al. 2002; Barron et al. 2008; Barron et al. 2017). However, closer 
investigation shows that our requirement that h must be positive (see section 3.3) explains this 
difference. If observations where h is negative are included, we find a negative mean value for Δρ. 
13 The ranking of the continuous variables by industry and year is equivalent to the estimation of 
industry and year fixed effects. Hence, we do not include such fixed effects separately in our regression 
estimates. In un-tabulated analysis, we confirm that ranking without reference to industry and year, but 




Since we use ranked regression in the multivariate analysis, we report the correlation 
coefficients of ranked variables in Table 3. Consistent with the BKLS model, we find 
that the change in consensus in analysts’ forecasts, Δρ, is positively related to the 
changes in the precision of analysts’ common information Δh. Interestingly, Δh and 
Δs are also positively related, suggesting that analysts’ common and private 
information may be complementary to each other. More importantly, Δρ, Δh, and Δs 
are positively related to all five measures of audit quality. This lends some support to 
our hypotheses that higher audit quality is positively associated with both increased 
common information in analysts’ forecasts, and higher precision of analysts’ 
information.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the five measures of audit quality are also positively associated with 
each other. Furthermore, Δρ, Δh, Δs are positively related to firm size, market-to-book 
ratio and the number of analysts following.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
4.2 Regression results 
In Table 4 we report results from ranked regressions using changes in ρ, h and s as 
dependent variables. Panel A shows models where the dependent variable (Δρ) 
represents the change in the consensus (ρ) in analysts’ forecasts from before to after 
the annual earnings announcement. We find that measures of audit quality are 
positively associated with changes in analyst consensus, suggesting that analysts give 
more weight to public information when forecasting earnings for firms with higher 
audit quality. These results are consistent with the results reported by Behn et al. 
(2008), that analysts’ forecasts become less dispersed when audit quality is higher. 
BKLS show that analysts’ forecast dispersion is smaller when the consensus among 
analysts is higher, or when the uncertainty about the firm’s future is lower. Our 
evidence of increased consensus supports the argument that the smaller forecast 
dispersion reported by Behn et al. is most likely a reflection of increased use of 
common information as a result of higher audit quality.  
 
Panel B of Table 4 presents the results from regressions using changes in the precision 
of analysts’ common information (Δh) as the dependent variable. The coefficients of 
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measures of audit quality are all positive and statistically significant. Taken together, 
the results in Panels A and B strongly support the prediction that higher quality audit 
is positively associated with more accurate common information that analysts use to 
develop their earnings forecasts.  
  
In our final set of tests (Table 4 Panel C), we examine the association between audit 
quality and the change in the precision of analysts’ private information (Δs). As we 
have noted, the expected effect of audit quality on the precision of analysts’ private 
information is less clear, reflecting uncertainty about the relation between private and 
common information. However, consistent with the univariate evidence in Table 3, 
analysts’ private information precision is positively associated with all the five 
measures of audit quality. These results suggest that higher quality audits also help 
analysts improve the precision of their private information. This is also consistent 
with Byard and Shaw (2003), who report that the precision of analysts’ private 
information is increasing in the quality of public disclosures. A further inference is 
that analysts develop private information partly from processing public information. 
  
Insert Table 4 here 
 
4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
The auditing literature has advanced several possible indicators for differential audit 
quality in addition to the ones that we report in the main results in Tables 4 and 5 
(DeFond and Zhang 2014). These alternative measures include audit fees and total 
fees, auditor tenure, and audit reporting lags. However, these measures typically 
reflect interaction between the client and the auditor, in contrast to our focus above on 
measures that reflect the structure of the market for audit services. Nevertheless, there 
is empirical evidence that higher audit fees, longer auditor (partner) tenure, and 
shorter audit reporting lags are associated with outcomes consistent with higher audit 
quality, such as the probability of restatement (e.g., Blankley et al., 2012, 2014; Carey 
and Simnett, 2006; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002). Hence, in sensitivity tests, we 
use each of these alternative measures of audit quality to re-estimate equation (6).14 
 
                                                 




The un-tabulated results show that audit fees and total fees are positively related to 
changes in ρ, h and s, suggesting that higher fees are likely to be related to higher 
audit quality and thus better information environment for financial analysts. 
Furthermore, auditor tenure is positively associated with BKLS measures of analysts’ 
information environment, implying that longer audit tenure is conducive to higher 
audit quality and improved information for analysts. Surprisingly, we find a positive 
relation between audit reporting lags and changes in ρ, h and s, implying a longer 
reporting lag is positively associated with an increase in common information in 
analysts’ forecasts after controlling for earnings news and firm characteristics.  
 
We conduct additional tests to further establish the robustness of our results. These 
tests address possible concerns about our sample selection process, the measurement 
of precision, the appropriate level of industry grouping, the identification of industry 
specialist auditors and the possible interaction between audit quality and the extent of 
earnings surprises. We briefly discuss each of these tests in turn. 
 
Our sample selection requires that analysts update their pre-announcement forecasts 
within 30 days of the annual earnings announcements. In additional tests, we relax the 
requirement of a pre-announcement forecast, and use all the earnings forecasts issued 
in the 30-day window following the earnings announcement. Our results remain 
unchanged with this larger sample. 
 
The method for estimation of the precision of analysts’ common information (h) and 
private information (s) is based on the assumption that analysts’ private information is 
equally precise. Gu (2004) relaxes this assumption and develops a model to estimate h 
and s without assuming that s is equal across analysts, where the average precision of 
analysts’ private information can be estimated using observed analyst forecasts. We 
follow this approach and re-estimate h and s. Our results remain unchanged.  
 
We also consider the sensitivity of our results to our definition of client-industry used 
to identify specialist auditors. In the results reported in Table 4, we estimated ranked 
regressions having ranked the variables within industry, where industries are defined 
at the two-digit SIC code. For robustness we also identify industries based on one-
digit SIC codes or the Fama-French 48 industry classification. We find similar results 
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using these two different industry classifications.  
 
Finally, we examine whether our results are robust to including an interaction term 
between our audit quality proxies and the magnitude of the earnings surprise. In our 
tests reported in Table 4, we assume audit quality is independent of forecast error, but 
it is possible that audit quality is directly associated with forecasting behavior (Ball et 
al. 2012) and therefore captures aspects of disclosure other than the quality of 
earnings releases. However, all of our primary results remain unchanged after 
including this interaction term. 
 
4.4 Endogenous auditor quality 
A possible alternative explanation for an association between analysts’ information 
environment and audit quality is the endogenous selection of higher quality auditors 
(i.e., the possibility that client industry market share is associated with characteristics 
that also explain, at least in part, differences in analysts’ precision). As an example, 
consider client firm size. Recall that the BKLS consensus and precision measures are 
computed from unconditional estimates of the dispersion and error in mean forecasts 
(see section 2.1). Given that these are correlated with firm size, it is not surprising that 
the resulting BKLS measures of consensus and precision are also correlated positively 
with firm size. We also expect that firm size is associated with the demand for audit 
quality, and to some extent there is a mechanical relationship between client market-
share based measures of audit quality and client firm size (Minuti-Meza 2013).15  
 
However, we utilize a research design which focuses on changes in analysts’ 
information environment, rather than levels per se. Changes in the BKLS measures 
reflect the level of these measures prior to the earnings release, and the change 
induced by this announcement. While the pre-announcement level of these variables 
is potentially impacted by endogeneity, changes associated with the earnings release 
                                                 
15  Minutti-Meza (2013) uses three proxies for the accounting effects of higher audit quality (i.e., 
proxies for higher accounting quality). These are the absolute value of unexpected accruals, meeting or 
beating analysts’ forecasts, and the propensity to issue a going concern audit opinion. Only the tests 
using unexpected accruals yield initial evidence of potentially spurious auditor specialization effects, 
and we note that these are tests of absolute (rather than signed) unexpected accruals. More generally, 
each of these proxies has been shown to lack power and/or be subject to significant biases in detecting 
earnings management, even when there is a clear incentive to engage in such behaviour (Dechow et al. 




are not, and so at least in part serve to “control” for endogenous auditor selection.16  
 
Nevertheless, we also endeavor to address endogeneity concerns in several ways.17 
First, we use a two-stage Heckman (1979) procedure, where our first stage regression 
estimates the likelihood of selecting a Big N auditor or a client industry 
specialist/leader auditor, while the second stage includes the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) 
as an additional term in the regressions reported in Table 4. Our first stage regression 
models the selection of a higher quality auditor as a function of firm size, asset mix 
(property plant and equipment as a percentage of total assets, the sum of receivables 
and inventory as a percentage of total assets), leverage, profitability (an indicator for a 
reported loss and a measure of ROA) and the issuance of debt during the reporting 
period. Of these variables, only firm size is controlled for in the second stage – the 
other variables are assumed to be at least largely exogenous of the analyst forecast 
properties that we model (Lennox et al. 2012). When we include the estimated IMR as 
an additional variable we find that it is significant, but our inferences about the audit 
quality proxies do not change from those reported in Table 4. 
 
However, as noted by Lennox et al. (2012), conclusions about the existence and 
direction of selection bias (and therefore, the extent to which results are robust to such 
biases) are entirely dependent on our choice of exclusion restrictions. One possible 
alternative is the use of propensity scores to create a “matched” sample, in the manner 
suggested by Lawrence et al. (2011) and Minutti-Meza (2013). Propensity score 
matching (PSM) assumes selection occurs only on the variables used to identify the 
matched sample, and is premised on the assumption that an appropriate comparison is 
between (in this case) firms using an auditor identified as high quality and those 
which, in some respects “should” make such a choice but do not. More worryingly, 
DeFond et al. (2014) show that the results in Lawrence et al. (2011) are very sensitive 
to research design choices, and suggest an alternative, namely coarsened exact 
matching (CEM).  
 
At a general level, both PSM and CEM require matching on some firm characteristics, 
but we observe relatively little consensus on what those characteristics should be. We 
                                                 
16 We are grateful to the reviewer for suggesting this point. 
17 Full details are available from the authors. 
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follow Minutti-Meza (2013) and choose two sets of characteristics for matching. The 
first set contains only firm size, and year and industry fixed effects. The second set 
includes firm size, property, plant and equipment, the sum of receivables and 
inventories, leverage, a loss dummy, return on assets and a dummy variable capturing 
debt issuance, as well as year and industry fixed effects. For PSM, we first estimate a 
probit model of auditor choice using firm characteristics, and obtain the propensity 
score which is basically the estimated probability of hiring an industry specialist 
auditor. Then we find matched firms with the closest propensity scores. In CEM, firm 
characteristics are first grouped into “bins” based on the range of characteristics. Then 
firms are matched to those in the same bin. A choice for CEM is the number of such 
bins, and we use the STATA package and the autocuts option to select the number of 
bins.  
 
After matching, we repeated the analysis in Table 4. It is apparent that the PSM 
results are sensitive to the choice of treatment-to-control ratio and caliper size, while 
the CEM results are sensitive to the choice of matching characteristics. In some cases 
the results for industry specialist auditors reported in Table 4 are significantly weaker, 
but in others results remain robust. The absence of any discernible pattern in this 
extensive battery of PSM and CEM tests arguably lends support to the sentiments 
expressed by Lennox et al. (2012) regarding the limited ability of such techniques to 
adequately “control” for endogenous auditor choice. 
 
As a final point, we highlight our use of a panel data design. Lennox et al. (2012) 
suggest that using a firm-specific fixed effect could eliminate the potential bias caused 
by endogeneity so long as the source of the endogeneity is constant over time. In a 
robustness test, we re-estimate equation (6) with firm fixed effects included (but year 
and industry fixed effects removed). We continue to find a positive and statistically 
significant association between measures of audit quality and changes in analysts’ 
consensus and information precision. This result suggests that our results are robust to 
endogeneity concerns. 
 
4.5 SOX effects 
As a final way of addressing endogeneity concerns, we consider the adoption of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) as an exogenous shock to audit quality and its impact on 
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analysts’ information environment. Passed in 2002, SOX created several restrictions 
on auditor-client relations such as banning the incumbent auditor from supplying 
many non-audit services to audit clients. It also created the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), and an entirely new oversight and review 
process focusing on audit quality (Tanyi and Litt 2017). Proponents have argued that 
such regulation has the effect of improving audit quality via reduced threats to auditor 
independence, although research generally fails to find evidence in support of these 
claims (Ruddock et al. 2006). SOX increased the litigation risk associated with 
financial reporting and thus created a stronger demand for high quality audits. In 
response, consistent with an increase in audit quality, average audit reporting lags 
have increased significantly from 40 days in 2001, to 48 days in 2003 (Knechel and 
Sharma 2012). We thus expect that the adoption of SOX represents a positive shock to 
audit quality for U.S. firms. Since non-U.S. firms are not directly subject to SOX and 
thus not expected to experience a significant change in their audit quality, we use non-
US firms as a benchmark. A comparison between U.S. and non-U.S. firms sheds light 
on the effect of a positive shock to audit quality resulting from SOX adoption on the 
properties of analysts’ information environment. We employ a difference-in-
difference research design to compare the changes in analysts’ information 
environment around 2002 for the U.S. firms with the corresponding changes for non-
U.S. firms. Specifically, we estimate the following regression model: 
 
DV = α + β1USA + β2PostSOX + β3USA × PostSOX + β4Audit + β5Surp + β6Size + 
β7MB + β8Analysts + ε                                                (7) 
 
where DV are the changes in BKLS measures of analysts’ information environment. 
USA is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the U.S. firms subject to SOX, and 0 for 
non-U.S. firms. PostSOX is an indicator variable for observations after 2002. We also 
include an interaction term between USA and PostSOX in the regressions, with control 
variables for the extent of the earnings surprise and firm characteristics as per the tests 
reported in Table 4. The coefficient associated with USA (β1) captures the difference 
in BKLS measures between U.S. and non-U.S. firms before 2002, while β2 captures 
the changes in BKLS measures for non-U.S. firms after 2002 (i.e., PostSOX). The 
coefficient associated with the interaction term, USA × PostSOX, (i.e., β3) captures 
the incremental changes in BKLS measures for U.S. firms, relative to the changes for 
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non-U.S. firms. If the improvements in audit quality resulting from SOX adoption 
lead to improvements in analysts’ information environment, we expect the coefficient 
of the interaction term to be positive.  
 
We collect data on non-U.S. firms from Compustat Global and I/B/E/S and construct 
the BKLS measures of analysts’ information environment. The sample selection 
procedure for non-U.S. firms is the same as that for the U.S. firms described in 
Section 3.2. We then combine the U.S. firms with the non-U.S. firms in the period 
from 1998 to 2007 to form the sample to estimate Equation 7.18  
 
The results from the difference-in-differences design are reported in Table 5. The 
results show that β1 is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that before 
2002, U.S. firms demonstrate greater improvement in analysts’ information 
environment around annual earnings announcements compared to non-U.S. firms. The 
coefficients on PostSOX (β2) are statistically indifferent from zero, suggesting that, for 
non-U.S. firms, the extent of any change in analysts’ information environment around 
annual earnings releases for non-U.S. firms did not change after 2002. Most 
importantly, the interaction term (USA × PostSOX) has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient (β3) in all the models, suggesting that U.S. firms experienced a 
significantly larger improvement in analysts’ information environment around 
earnings announcements after 2002, relative to non-U.S. firms. This evidence 
supports the view that SOX improved audit quality for U.S. firms, and thus was also 
associated with increased consensus among analysts around the release of annual 
earnings. This additional test using SOX adoption as an exogenous shock to audit 
quality therefore lends strong support to our main results in Table 4 that higher quality 
audits have a positive impact on analysts’ information environment.  
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
5. Conclusions 
Inferences about the effect of audit quality on users of financial reports are typically 
                                                 
18 This period includes five years before SOX adoption and five years after the adoption. We obtain 
similar results if we change the windows to 3 years or 10 years before and after the SOX adoption. 
Notice that this sample of U.S. and non-U.S. data, while including more countries, is a shorter time-
period (1998-2007) than that for U.S. data employed in Table 4 (1985-2015); hence the smaller sample 
size in Table 5. 
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based on tests using stock prices, experimental research using a limited number of 
actual subjects, or surveys. An alternative approach is suggested by Behn et al. (2008), 
who examine the association of audit quality with certain attributes of sell-side 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. However, although they demonstrate increased accuracy 
and reduced dispersion when the auditor is a Big N audit firm, their results do not 
extend to the widely used notion of client-industry specialization as an indicator of 
audit quality. When viewed in conjunction with other research that fails to observe 
audit quality impacting on sell-side analysts (Donovan et al. 2014; Brown et al. 2015), 
the extent to which audit quality impacts capital market participants is uncertain. We 
therefore use a setting where the focus is on changes in analysts’ information 
environment around the release of annual audited earnings. We expect that this 
window is most likely to capture the influence of audited financial data and, by 
extension, any incremental effect of expected differences in audit quality.  
 
Our tests rely on widely-used measures of analysts’ information environment (BKLS), 
whereby analysts’ information set is characterized as comprising common and private 
information. If audit quality impacts the inputs to analysts’ earnings forecasting 
process, we would expect common indicators of higher audit quality to be positively 
associated with changes in analysts’ reliance on public information (i.e., including the 
audited financial statements), as well as a positive association with changes in the 
estimated precision of public information. Although audit quality may be positively 
associated with changes in the precision of private information, such effects would not 
be expected to outweigh the impact of audit quality on common information effects.  
 
Using the BKLS method, we find that a Big N indicator and commonly used measures 
of auditor client-industry specialization are associated with a measure of increased 
consensus in revised forecasts issued shortly after earnings releases. This evidence 
indicates that analysts place increased weight on common sources of information 
relative to private information. This is precisely what we would expect if observable 
indicators of audit quality actually impact on the use of information applied in the 
forecasting process. Consistent with the consensus results, we also find a significantly 
higher increase in the precision of common information for clients audited by industry 
specialist auditors. While higher audit quality is also positively associated with 
increased precision in analysts’ private information, this effect is not sufficient to 
23 
 
outweigh the effects on common information. 
 
Our use of a changes specification reduces to some extent concerns that endogenous 
auditor selection explains our results. Although cross-sectional differences in analysts’ 
information environment may reflect factors which also underlie the demand for 
higher audit quality, our tests focus on changes in analysts’ information environment 
over a short period, holding fixed the choice of audit quality. Our confidence in a 
causal interpretation is further enhanced by an additional test using the passage of 
SOX as an exogenous shock to audit quality, as well as the robustness of our results to 
the application of standard econometric procedures used to identify possible 
endogeneity effects. Our primary results are also robust to alternative indicators of 
differences in audit quality, such as audit fees and auditor tenure. 
 
Overall, our evidence provides support for the argument that audit quality has capital 
market consequences, at least in so far as it impacts on sell-side analysts as users of 
accounting information. Our results also support the view that client industry 
specialization/leadership is an indicator of higher audit quality. Finally, our findings 
provide a more complete explanation for the findings in Behn et al. (2008), namely 
that analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy is higher for firms audited by Big N auditors. 
Our analysis indicates that improved forecast accuracy may result from the fact that 
higher quality audits not only increase the precision of analysts’ common information, 
but also assists analysts to develop more accurate private information. Of course, the 
precise channel by which audit quality impacts sell-side analysts is still to be specified. 
Whether that is via improved earnings predictability, lower variance, less 
conservatism or other specific attributes that might be associated with higher audit 
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∆ρ         Changes in BKLS measure of consensus among financial analysts (estimated from 
Equation 1) from before to after the annual earnings announcement.  
∆h        Changes in BKLS measure of the precision of analysts’ common information 
(estimated from Equation 2) from before to after the annual earnings announcement.  
∆s    Changes in BKLS measure of the precision of analysts’ private information 
(estimated from Equation 3) from before to after the annual earnings announcement.  
Measures of audit quality 
BigN     An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s audit is one of the Big N audit firms, 
and 0 otherwise.  
Share    Market share (measured in client sales) of the firm’s auditor in an industry defined 
by two-digit SIC codes. 
Leader    An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor has largest market share 
(measured in client sales) in an industry defined by two-digit SIC codes, and 0 
otherwise. 
Sharecl   Market share (measured in number of clients) of the firm’s auditor in an industry 
defined by two-digit SIC codes. 
Mostcl   An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor has largest market share 
(measured in number of clients) in an industry defined by two-digit SIC codes, and 0 
otherwise. 
Other variables 
Analysts  Number of individual analysts’ forecasts used in estimating ρ, h and s. 
MB      Market-to-Book ratio. 
PostSOX An indicator variable equal to 1 for observations after 2002, and 0 otherwise 
Size       Natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization. 
Surp Earnings surprise, calculated as the absolute value of the difference between actual 
earnings per share and mean analyst forecasts made 60 days before the earnings 
announcements, scaled by the absolute value of actual earnings per share. 


















Firms with at least two analysts issuing forecasts for year t+1 
earnings within 60 days before announcement of year t earnings 56,621 9,701 
Firms with at least two analysts revising forecasts for year t+1 
earning within 30 days after announcement of year t earnings 34,854 7,053 
Firms with precision of analysts' information  32,455 6,793 
Firms with positive value for the precision of analysts' information 28,416 6,468 








This table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of 25,111 firm-year observations over the period 
from 1985 to 2015.  Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
∆ρ 0.076 0.350 -0.042 0.003 0.110 
∆h 66.065 278.435 0.002 1.371 19.735 
∆s -14.712 258.188 -0.749 0.002 1.367 
BigN 0.943 0.232 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Share 0.240 0.142 0.136 0.227 0.320 
Leader 0.290 0.454 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Sharecl 0.181 0.076 0.133 0.174 0.221 
Mostcl 0.233 0.423 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Surp 0.159 0.419 0.011 0.034 0.103 
Size 7.746 1.673 6.564 7.671 8.879 
MB 3.209 4.240 1.416 2.262 3.781 





Correlation Coefficients of Ranked Variables 
 
This table reports correlation coefficients for the variables. Variables are as defined in the Appendix and transformed into their rankings each year within an industry defined 
by two-digit SIC codes. All the coefficients are statistically significant at 1% level.  
 
  ∆ρ ∆h ∆s BigN Share Leader Sharecl Mostcl Surp Size MB 
∆h           0.664           
∆s              0.350 0.628          
BigN 0.703 0.708 0.701         
Share 0.611 0.616 0.610 0.868        
Leader 0.723 0.726 0.723 0.871 0.866       
Sharecl 0.612 0.614 0.610 0.820 0.817 0.805      
Mostcl 0.732 0.731 0.729 0.862 0.785 0.917 0.850     
Surp 0.595 0.581 0.621 0.701 0.601 0.724 0.611 0.736    
Size 0.602 0.620 0.589 0.769 0.702 0.746 0.645 0.729 0.524   
MB 0.595 0.620 0.590 0.703 0.616 0.727 0.618 0.733 0.548 0.712  





Regression Analysis of Changes in Analysts’ Information Environment 
 
This table presents the summary regression results from the following model:  
Δρ (Δh, Δs) = α0 + α1Audit Quality + α2Surp + α3Size + α4MB + α5Analyst + ε 
where Audit Quality is measured by Share, Leader, Sharecl, Mostcl, respectively. The sample consists of 25,111 
firm-year observations over the period from 1985 to 2015. Variables are defined in the Appendix, and 
transformed into their rankings each year within an industry defined by two-digit SIC codes. Standard errors are 
adjusted for both firm and year clusters. T-statistics are reported beneath the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate 
that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
 
 
Panel A: Audit Quality and changes in analysts’ consensus (Δρ) 
 
Variable BigN Share Leader Sharecl Mostcl 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Audit 0.537*** 0.163*** 0.263*** 0.211*** 0.466*** 
 (16.35) (17.74) (25.00) (15.49) (14.96) 
Surp 0.149*** 0.253*** 0.220*** 0.233*** 0.147*** 
 (8.89) (24.50) (24.69) (20.59) (12.25) 
Size 0.050*** 0.153*** 0.149*** 0.178*** 0.155*** 
 (3.69) (10.14) (10.15) (12.10) (11.03) 
MB 0.122*** 0.172*** 0.145*** 0.144*** 0.090*** 
 (9.07) (13.24) (10.91) (10.24) (6.36) 
Analysts 0.039*** 0.099*** 0.081*** 0.087*** 0.042*** 
 (2.97) (9.09) (7.67) (8.14) (3.51) 
Intercept 2.378*** 3.711*** 3.287*** 3.409*** 2.313*** 
 (7.65) (9.72) (9.52) (10.23) (10.91) 
 
     
N 25,111 25,111 25,111 25,111 25,111 

























Panel B: Audit Quality and changes in analysts’ common information (Δh) 
 
Variable BigN Share Leader Sharecl Mostcl 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Audit 0.523*** 0.169*** 0.266*** 0.193*** 0.433*** 
 
(16.40) (12.40) (18.03) (20.91) (14.91) 
Surp 0.052*** 0.151*** 0.119*** 0.138*** 0.057*** 
 
(3.11) (11.30) (9.55) (10.27) (3.70) 
Size 0.098*** 0.195*** 0.192*** 0.224*** 0.203*** 
 
(5.91) (11.97) (12.29) (14.11) (13.02) 
MB 0.163*** 0.211*** 0.184*** 0.187*** 0.137*** 
 
(13.61) (16.35) (14.05) (14.57) (10.33) 
Analysts 0.066*** 0.123*** 0.105*** 0.115*** 0.072*** 
 
(4.33) (9.33) (8.63) (9.76) (5.93) 
Intercept 2.253*** 3.514*** 3.101*** 3.301*** 2.271*** 
 
(7.45) (9.48) (9.24) (9.81) (10.42) 
 
     
N 25,111 25,111 25,111 25,111 25,111 
R2 0.510 0.477 0.488 0.483 0.509 
 
 
Panel C: Audit Quality and changes in analysts’ private information (Δs) 
 
Variable BigN Share Leader Sharecl Mostcl 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Audit 0.447*** 0.147*** 0.224*** 0.156*** 0.369*** 
 
(15.69) (13.47) (17.42) (14.17) (10.74) 
Surp 0.168*** 0.252*** 0.226*** 0.244*** 0.173*** 
 
(17.75) (38.76) (34.08) (44.00) (13.78) 
Size 0.003 0.085*** 0.084*** 0.113*** 0.093*** 
 
(0.20) (5.14) (5.31) (7.80) (6.70) 
MB 0.124*** 0.164*** 0.142*** 0.147*** 0.102*** 
 
(15.06) (23.70) (20.96) (18.89) (9.93) 
Analysts 0.167*** 0.215*** 0.201*** 0.211*** 0.173*** 
 
(11.95) (16.39) (15.26) (14.53) (10.83) 
Intercept 2.079*** 3.152*** 2.817*** 3.014*** 2.104*** 
 
(7.69) (9.33) (9.11) (9.80) (11.12) 
 
     
N 25,111 25,111 25,111 25,111 25,111 







Effect of SOX on Analysts’ Information Properties 
 
This table reports regression results from the following model: 
Δρ(Δh, Δs) = α0 + α1USA + α2PostSOX + α3USA × PostSOX + α4Surp + α5Size + α6MB + α7Analysts + ε 
using a sample for firm-year observations from U.S. and non-U.S. markets during the period from 1998 to 
2007. Variables are defined in the Appendix. Except USA and PostSOX, variables are transformed into 
their rankings each year within an industry defined by two-digit SIC codes. Standard errors are adjusted for 
both firm and year clusters. T-statistics are reported beneath the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate that the 
coefficients are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
 
 Variable Δρ Δh Δs 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
USA 8.197*** 11.450*** 8.884*** 
 
(4.61) (4.84) (6.89) 
PostSOX -0.916 -0.359 0.062 
 
(-0.79) (-0.28) (0.12) 
USA × PostSOX 4.875** 4.440** 3.652** 
 
(2.14) (2.21) (2.07) 
Surp 0.211*** 0.184*** 0.234*** 
 
(14.70) (10.65) (19.54) 
Size 0.197*** 0.139*** 0.113*** 
 
(15.80) (7.51) (7.78) 
MB 0.205*** 0.206*** 0.219*** 
 
(13.81) (13.30) (21.16) 
Analysts 0.178*** 0.240*** 0.224*** 
 
(13.62) (20.43) (11.14) 
Constant -0.802 -2.557*** -1.270*** 
 
(-1.12) (-2.86) (-3.25) 
    N 13,546 13,546 13,546 
R2 0.452 0.440 0.450 
 
  
